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1 INTRODUCTION 
South Africa enacted its first compulsory unemployment insurance scheme 
on a national basis in 1937. Since 1966 the position was regulated by the 
Unemployment Insurance Act 30 of 1966 (UIA). which is soon to be replaced 
by new legislation. The proposed legislation is currently in the form of the 
. I 
Unemployment Insurance BIll (UIB) and the Unemployment Insurance 
Contributions Bill (UICB). 
In this contribution the unemployment insurance system in South Africa 
under the UIA and the proposed legislation will be discussed against the 
background of the constitutional provision regarding the right of access to 
social security (s 27( I )(c) of the Constitution) and the constitutional impera-
tive to consider international law when interpreting this fundamental right, 
and also the constitutional empowerment to consider foreign law (s 39 of the 
Constitution). 
2 THE AIM AND PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION 
The purpose of the UIA as well as the UIB is to insure employees who had 
contributed to the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) against the risk of 
losing their earnings fully or partly because they became unemployed, or fell 
ill, or fell pregnant. or adopted a child. Unemployment benefits may also be 
claimed by a dependant of a deceased contributor. 
In foreign systems unemployment insurance schemes generally provide 
only for the risk of losing employment (hereafter referred to as unemploy-
ment benefits), while separate funds provide for benefits in the event of 
maternity. adoption. illness and death. It is suggested that the example of 
foreign systems be adopted so that the regulation of unemployment 










































LAW, DE.\K;CRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
insurance is restricted to "pure" unemployment issues, and one or more 
separate systems cater for the other contingencies, To do otherwise leads to 
a loss of proper focus on the provision of benefits in the event of unemploy, 
ment and achieving the purpose discussed here, From a social security point 
of view especially it is preferable to deal with each of these risks together 
with O(her aspects of each risk, for instance, illness may be dealt with 
together with health care, maternity and adoption benefits with family 
benefits, and death benefits with survivors' benefits, In this contribution the 
concept of unemployment will be dealt with in the narrow sense, namely 
where a contributor to the UIF is without a job, 
In the preamble to the ILO Convention on Employment Promotion and 
Protection against Unemployment 168 of 1991 (C I 68) it is recognised that 
the best protection against the adverse effects of involuntary unemployment 
lies in policies to stable, sustained, non-inflationary economic growth: 
a flexible response to change; and the creation and promotion of all forms 
of productive and chosen employment. including the creation and 
promotion of small undertakings, co-operatives and self-employment. In 
various articles C 168 clearly advocates a move away from purely assistance-
oriented activities towards activities which promote elY)ployment and also 
make unemployment less amactive than employment. 
In countries where unemployment levels have been reduced and employ-
ment levels increased, the reduction has been attributed largely to a shift 
from passive labour market policies (ie providing passive financial assistance 
by paying benefits to the unemployed) to active labour market policies (ie 
paying for active measures conducive to creating conditions that will increase 
employability and encourage the hiring of employees, and providing 
incentives for the unemployed to activate them to enter or reintegrate into 
the world of work, be it as employees or as self-employed), Active labour 
market policies are aimed at strengthening the shift from welfare to work 
and at addreSSing the causes of unemployment rather than merely the 
consequences, Active poliCies are perceived to be more cost-effective, They 
have been proven to be effective in providing incentives toward fuller 
employment and reintegrating unemployed persons, 
In the European Union the development of active labour market policies 
reflects a reaction to the fiscal and strain arising from the 
comprehensive and sophisticated unemployment support systems that had 
been generally instituted, The measures are reflected in the Policy Guidelines 
of the European Union, which are bindi!lg on member states, and in the 
legislation of the various member states,) Various countries outside the EU 
have also shifted from passive labour market policies to active market 
polici~s. notably the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
Chile, 
2 Article 8 further sels out rhe need to promote prodllcllve employment. 
3 MISSOC 1997: Kessler F ill MISSOC 1999: European Council The 1999 Emp/oymvnl 
Guidelines 
4 Waldfogel 1997:20, Gorlick ami Brerhour I q98: Hawke 1')98:33, Maloney 1997 










































eEl TO WORK ON lJNEMPLOYMENT 
The UIA to some extent addresses the need to activate the labour market. 
Its stated purpose includes "the combatting of unemployment" and the Act 
contains several measures aimed at combatting unemployment and 
reintegrating the unemployed into the world of work. Firstly, if the Minister 
of Labour is of the opinion that unemployment exists or is likely to arise in 
any business or area, he may provide for a scheme to keep contributors in 
employment or to place the unemployed in employment (s 46). The purpose 
of this provision will hopefully be promoted by the recently legislated Skills 
Development Act 97 of 1998. Secondly, contributors who become unem-
ployed. and accept employment at less than half the average rate of earnings 
during the three months preceding the date on which they became unem-
ployed. are entitled to receive a special weekly allowance equal to the 
difference between their new remuneration and half their previous average 
earnings (s 48). Thirdly, contributors who were employed by two employers 
simultaneously and lose one job while continuing in the other do not lose 
their entitlement in respect of the lost employment simply because they 
retain the other position (s 35(11 )). The second and third provisions 
mentioned here are aimed at reintegrating unemployed persons into the 
workplace. They give effect to C 168 which requires the provision of benefits 
in circumstances of partial unemployment, described as the loss of earnings 
as a result of the temporary reduction in the normal or statutory hours of 
work (art 10.1). 
In contrast, the proposed legislation contains no provision indicating that 
the legislature has seriously considered. or plans to seriously consider, 
measures to prevent unemployment, nor are there any measures aimed at 
reintegrating the unemployed. In fact, only persons who are fully unem-
ployed will be entitled to benefits.' In this regard the UIB was drafted in 
disregard of international law as well as developments in foreign legal systems, 
and also represents a step backwards from the position under the UIA. 
The stated purpose of the U IB is (inter alia) to establish an unemployment 
insurance fund (UIF) from which the unemployed are entitled to benefits 
"and in so doing to alleviate the harmful economic and social effects of 
unemployment" (clause 2). In not taking into account the wider aim of 
unemployment insurance, namely preventing or avoiding or combatting 
unemployment, and not promoting integrative labour market policies aimed 
at preventing unemployment and creating incentives for integration and/or 
re-integration in the labour market, the UIB does not move away from a 
5 The only provision which may possibly lead to measures to this effect is clause 39 of the UIB 
whictl empowers the UnemploymEm Insurance Board to adVise the Minister on unemploy-
ment insurance policy and to make recommendations to the Minister on changes to legisla-
tion insofar as it impaC[s on unemployment poliCY. However. in view of the fact that the 
stated purpose of the UIB. as well as the provIsions of the proposeci legislatIon. are com-
pletely silent on an active labour market policy. It is unlikely that the f10ard ancl the Minister 
will utilise clause 39 to achieve an active policy. Since these additional purposes are not 
presently incluclecl in clause 2 of the um. it is highly unlikely that any surplus in the Funcl 
will be usecl towarcis giving effect to funcimg any progran1l11C. scheme or even research into 
preventative measures - given the provIsion in the UII:l that [he surplus mayor utllisecl [0 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
passive labour market policy lO an active policy and is therefore not in 
keeping with an approach to unemployment insurance which is increasingly 
being adopted world~wide. 
On the other hand. the requirement In C 168 that benefits must be pro~ 
vided in periodical payments calculated in such a way that the unemployed 
receives a partial and transitional wage replacement and. at the same time. 
to avoid disincentives either to work or to create employment. are met by 
the UIB in that partial payments are made. The limitation of benefits is also 
aimed at encouraging the unemployed to work. 
3 ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM 
Under the UlA the administration and regulation of the statutory scheme for 
unemployment insurance fall fully within the jurisdiction of the Department 
of Labour. In terms of the proposed legislation the UICB (administered by the 
Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service (SARS)) will regulate the 
compulsory payment of contributions and other fiscal aspects, while the UlB 
(administered by the Department of Labour) will regulate the administration 
of the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) and individuals' entitlement to 
benefits. 
The general scheme of the proposed legislation is that the SARS Commis-
sioner has the duty to collect contributions and pay these 0 into the National 
Revenue Fund to the credit of the UIF. The Director~General of the Depart-
ment of Labour must within seven days allocate these amounts to the Fund. 
The Ul Commissioner must receive the contributions paid into tfle Fund, 
must create and maintain a database of contributions and employers. and 
may pay benefits to contributors in accordance with the information on the 
database (UIB clause 56). 
Various problems arise from the manner in which the dual administration 
is dealt with. First. despite the general provision that the SARS CommiSSioner 
has the duty to collect contributions. contributions in to an employee 
who is taxable must be paid [Q the Commissioner of SARS (UICB clause 7) 
whilst contributions in regard to an employee who is not taxable must be 
paid to the UlF (UICB clause 8) This may lead to cumbersome administration 
for employers and also to administrative problems for the authorities as well 
as employers where a particular employee at times falls within the tax net 
and at other times outside it. Secondly, the SARS Commissioner may 
the power to collect contributions to the Ul Commissioner. It is 
possible that delegation of the power to collect contributions will nullify the 
purpose of regulating the collecting of contributions under the fiscal regime. 
and that confusion may arise as to where powers are to be exercised. 
Thirdly, the South African Revenue Services Commissioner must collect 
contributions whereas the database of the Fund is located with the UI 
Commissioner. The administrative overlap may cause confusion and severe 
problems for an unemployed person when claiming benefits and cause 
additional state expenditure 










































4 FUNDING OF THE SYSTEM AND CALCULATION OF 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Whereas the U1A excludes persons earning Rq3 288 per annum from the 
operation of the Act, the proposed legislation will remove the earnings 
threshold so that contributions are payable in respect of every employee. The 
proposed legislation com with section 27 of the Constitution in that no 
employee is barred from access to unemployment insurance on the grounds 
of level of earnings. 
In terms of the UIA as well as the UICB every employer and every con-
tributor or employee who falls within the ambit of the Act or Bill must 
contribute 1 % of the employee's remuneration to the UIF on a monthly basis 
(S 2q UIA and clause 6 U1CB). Contributors earning above the threshold of 
R 132 000 per year will contribute 1 % of the threshold and will receive 
beneFits payable at this level (schedule 1 UICB) The employer must withhold 
the em ployee's contribution From the normal wages and pay the deduction 
to the authorities with its own contribution. 
UIA contributions are calculated on the basis oJ an employee's "earnings", 
and UIB/UICB contributions on "remuneration".' "Remuneration" is defined 
in the UICB with reFerence to the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Act (a 
definition that differs from "earnings" in the UIA) but is not defined in the 
UIB. Inconsistent treatment of the basis for contributions and benefits may 
arise from problems concerning the definition, and also because personnel 
of the two may interpret "remuneration" differently. 
Since employees may be prejudiced by an employer's failure to pay over 
the contributions to the authorities, the legislator penalises such 
an employer. In terms of the UIA the Director-General may, in addition to 
requiring payment of the overdue amount, impose a penalty on an employer 
For late underpayment and non-payment. However, the penalty 
may be waived (s 31). The UICB provides improved protection of contribu-
tors' right to access to unemployment benefits. An employer who fails to 
deduct contributions is liable for payment of the full contributions and is not 
allowed to deduct arrear contributions from the employee. However, if the 
employer deducted an amount that was not due or payable in terms of the 
Act, or was in excess of the amount due, the employer must refund the 
amount to the employee notwithstanding the fact that the amount was not 
refunded to the employer (clause 6 UICB). A penalty of 10% of anRunpaid 
amount is payable together with interest on the outstanding amount.' Lastly, 
if a late payment or an underpayment has the effect that an employee loses 
hisl her entitlement to benefits or becomes entitled to a reduced benefit, the 
employer has to pay the employee the amount to which the employee is 
actually entitled and must in addition pay a penalty of 200 % of the unpaid 
amount. 
Apart from these provisions, the proposed legislation contains various 
other provisions aimed at efficiently collecting all contributions that are 
7 See 3 UJ/\, and s I UICFl rt'ad With the Fourth Schedule of rile Income Tax Act. 










































Lt\W, DEMOCR/\CY & DEVELOPMENT 
payable and at maintaining a solvent Fund. To this end the basis for 
calculating contributions is by way of using the definition in the Income Tax 
Act; the SARS Commissioner must collect the bulk of contributions; more 
categories of employees are included as contributors; the earnings limit as 
barrier to access is removed; and provisions aimed at avoiding double-
dipping from the UIF are to be enacted. From a social security point of view 
these provisions are welcomed since solvency of the U I F is of crucial 
importance to ensuring the payment of benefits. 
5 THE CATEGORIES OF PERSONS WHO MAY BE ENTITLED TO 
CLAIM UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
o 1(l 
In terms of both the UIA and the UIB certain categories of persons are not 
in a position to contribute to the Fund and accordingly cannot claim unem-
ployment benefits. They a re therefore excluded from access to the statutory 
unemployment insurance scheme. The proposed legislation does, however, 
broaden the contributor base by including more categories and by removing 
the earnings level. This broadening of the contributor base is conceivably the 
greatest achievement of the proposed legislation. Not only will it strengthen the 
financial base of the Fund and thereby help to sustain the unemployed, but 
it will bring the proposed legislation closer to compliance with section 21 of 
the Constitution and with international norms. It is, however, doubtful whether 
the proposed legislation is sufficiently close to international norms, considering 
that the norm as stated in C 168 is that the persons protected should comprise 
not less than 85 % of all employees in a country. 
The continued exclusion of some groups might constitute an unjustifiable 
limitation on the constitutional right of access (Q unemployment benefits. 
Public servants are excluded by both the current and proposed legislation. 
In the past the rationale for excluding public servants from the statutory 
unemployment insurance scheme was that they were regarded as having job 
9 III t"rrns of the t:IA Elle followll1g categories are excluded: (!) Persons who enter the 
Repubhc for the pwpose of carrylllg Ou[ a contract of service. apprenticeship or learnership. 
il there is a legal or a conrractual reqUirement that such persons mUSt leave the Republic 
upon termination of the contract. ThiS provision exclu(ies many foreign workers from access 
to the fund. (2) Persons whose rate of earnings exceed R93 288 per annum. Due to rhe fact 
that ernployees rnay be gramed salary increases. which may take them outside the category 
of contnbutors. with rhe tact that the limit has been raised on annual basis. many 
employees 10 the Fund on an irregular basis. Persons casually and 
nOT lor the purposes of the employer's buslf1css. (4) Persons employed for than one full 
working day or less than eight hours per calendar week, whichever is (5) Domestic 
servants. (6) The husband or wife of an employer who works for that employer. (7) Persons 
who are officers In terms of the Public Service Act of 1994. (8) Persons a 
provincial administration (lf1cluding a school governing board or a hospital is 
under the conlrol of a provincial adrnmisrration) who contribute to the Governrnent Em-
ployees PenSion Fund. (9) Cenam educators. (I Q) Officers on the fixed esrablishment of 
f'ariiamenr. 
lOin rerrns of the LJIB the fOllowing categories are excluded: (I) t:mployees of the Covernrnem 
(nauonal and (2) Persons entitled to remuneration in terms of a learnership 
under the Developrnem Act. (3) Persons empioyed lor less than 24 hours ppr month 










































GET TO Wor{K ON UNEMPLOYMENT 
security and therefore not in need of protection against unemployment. 
However, public servants in South Africa no longer have job security (neither 
legally nor factually) to the extent that their exclusion from unemploy-
ment protection can be justified, The unemployment figures released by 
Statistics SA at the end of March 2000 and June 2000 indicate that the public 
service has recently suffered more job losses than most other sectors. 
A second argument for excluding public servants was that they are cared for 
financially by the State as employer and/or the state pension fund through 
advantageous severance packages in the event of loss of a job. However, 
it is doubtful that these payments are more favourable than those in the 
private sector. The exclusion of public servants may therefore well be 
attacked on constitutional grounds. It is, furthermore, not in accordance with 
C 168 in terms of which public servants may be excluded from protection 
only if their employment is guaranteed up to the normal retirement age 
(art 1 1.1). 
Learners are expressly excluded by the proposed legislation in contrast to 
the position under the UIA where any person who has entered into or works 
under a contract of apprenticeship or a contract of learnership is a contribu-
tor. The exclusion of a group that was previously included bucks the trend 
towards extended coverage. The administration of contributions and 
enforcement of the statutory provisions should be reasonably manageable 
since learners are normally employed for a considerable time (mostly 1 to 
2 years). Learners belong to a particularly vulnerable group, especially in 
times where the economy is unable to absorb the young and newly qualified. 
This exclusion is also contrary to international norms. Article 1 1. I of C 168 
requires that apprentices should enjoy protection. 
Domestic workers are excluded presently and also by the proposed legisla-
tion. Neither the UIB nor the UICB defines "domestic worker". Without a 
definition the position of many employees will remain uncertain. The 
intention is clearly that domestic workers should be granted access to 
unemployment benefits since section 4 of both bills provide that 
"there shall be an investigation undertaken by an appropriale body. appointed by 
the Minister. to investigate methods and make recommendations to the Minister, 
in regard to including domestic workers under coverage of this Act". 
Persons whose remuneration is based on the output oj their work are effectively 
excluded by the proposed legislation if their remuneration is based on the 
quantity or output of work done, unless the amount is part of their minimum 
compensation in terms of any law, collective agreement or contract or 
employment.
11 
This is in contrast with the U IA definition of "contributor" 
which includes somebody "whose earnings are calculated ... by work done". 
In light of the fact that the quantity or output of work done is increasingly 
made to constitute the sole contractual basis for remuneration, this exclusion 
will probably not be a justifiable limitation on the right of access to unem-
ployment benefits. In addition, the exclusion of a previously included 
category does not seem justifiable. 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Independent contractors, the informally and the atypically 
are excluded under both the current and the proposed legislation, It is 
suggested that provision For voluntary access to the UIF. or the settiQg up a 
separate social protection and/or unemployment insurance schemes." would 
be in keeping with section 27 of the Constitution, with the recommendations 
made by the 1996 [LO country review (Standing et al 1996:446), the SA 
Labour Market Commission Report (Van Ginneken 1999) and with the 
findings of an important ILO study (Standing et al 1996:66) on the position 
of the atypically employed. Such voluntary access may be granted also for 
other employees who cannot comfortably be fitted into the statutory scheme. 
6 CONTINGENCIES COVERED 
Whilst Convention 168 aims at promoting active labour market policies. it 
acknowledges that involuntary unemployment does exist and that social 
security should therefore provide unemployment assistance and 
economic support to those who are involuntarily unemployed (art 10). 
Whereas unemployment benefits are granted under the UIA irrespective 
of whether a contributor resigned or was dismissed. the UIB comes closer to 
the international norm according to which benefits arise only from involun-
tary unemployment. It provides that an unemployed contributor is entitled 
to unemployment benefits if the reason for the unemployment is the 
termination of employment by the employer (clause 8(1) UIB). However, this 
wording does nor cover all circumstances where unemployment arises 
outside the control,of the employee. for example where an employer 
becomes insolvent. to The legislation should be brought in line with C 168 
which provides that benefits may be refused. withdrawn, suspended or 
reduced to the extent prescribed when it has been determined by the 
competent authority that the person concerned has left the employment 
voluntarHy without just cause (art 20(b)) 
It also provides that benefits may be refused. withdrawn, suspended or 
reduced to the extent prescribed if the person concerned had deliberately 
contributed to his or her own dismissal (art 20(c» No reference is made in 
the UIB to such grounds For disqualification, 
Convention 168 provides for the contingency of full unemployment (de-
scribed as loss of earnings by a person who is capable of working. available 
for work and actually seeking work), partial unemployment (described as loss 
of earnings as a result of the temporary reduction in the normal or statutory 
hours of work), the situation where there is a lack of earnings during a period 
that a part-time worker seeks full-time employment benefits should 
be kept to a level where the total of benefits and earnings from the part-time 
work may maintain incentives to take up full-time work) (art 10.1), and in 
12 This has been clolle in certain European cOllntrles. where schemes usually allow the self-
employed to make voluntary contributions. See Sci10ukens 1994:57 
68 
In terms of 5 38 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 the contract of employment terminates 
automatically tn the event of Insolvency of rhe employer. The contract is also automatically 









































GET TO WORK ON UNEMPLOY,\1EN'1 
circumstances of suspension or reducrion of earnings due to a temporary 
suspension of work. without any break In the employment relationship. for 
reasons of an economic. technological. structural or similar cause (the 
rationale being to protect and maintain some measure of income 
ment in the event of such a contingency occurring and to ensure speedy 
reintegration into the labour market once the suspension comes co an end) 
(an 10,2), The ILO's broad view of contingencies covered reflects the 
importance attached to integrating and reintegrating the unemployed into 
the world of work, 
Whereas the UIA provides for the contingency of full and partial unem-
ployment the proposed legislation takes a narrower view, providing only for 
full unemployment. Other serious Shortcomings in the UIB are that it makes 
no provision for a right to benefits for any period that a contributor has a 
part-time work and that unemployed persons will not retain some benefits 
while making their way back into the world of work, Furthermore. in South 
AFrican law the suspension of the contract of employment. for example in 
the event of a protected strike or as a result of the employer's operational 
requirements. legally has the result that the employer's obligation to 
remunerate and grant ancillary benefits is also suspended, In these circum-
stances employees may be without income, It is recommended that the 
contingencies covered should be extended beyond full unemployment in 
accordance with international norms, 
7 THE CALCULATION OF BENEFITS 
Convention 168 as well as the SA legislation (current and proposed) limit the 
quantum of benefits to a portion of the wages that were lost due to unem-
ployment. as one aspect of the underlying policy is to an 
unemployed person to return to the workforce, Article 15 of Convention 168 
requires that benefits should be no less than 45 % of the earnings, 
Whereas the UIA complied with this requirement by granting benefits of 45 % 
of previous earnings, the UIB deviates from this norm by for a 
graduated scale of benefits ranging from 29.5% to % of previous 
earnings, The bottom of the scale is considerably lower than the international 
norm. and the top scale may be too high to discourage continued unem-
ployment The graduated scale will lead to discrepancies and disparities thal 
may find disfavour with contributors, ,4 
The accrual of a contributor's entitlement to benefits under the UIB. at a 
rate of days for every completed 42 days of employment as a 
contributor, is subject to a maximum accrual of 238 days' benefit in a 
of four years immediately preceding the date of application for 
benefits, less any days of benefit received by the contributor during this 
period (clause 5 UIB), The calculation of the four-year period is unclear and 
14 For example a person who earned R9 000 per month will g~( R3 420 per month (38 % of 
income) whereas a person who earned RIO 000 per month will get R2 945 per month 
of income) ahhough the latt~r and hiS or twr employt~r paid more In conrnburions 










































LAW. DeMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
uncertain. and may become problematic where a person is intermittently 
employed and unemployed. or where a person receives benefits for a period 
and leaves the country for some period during the four-year period"j and 
thereafter returns to South Africa (either as an employed or unemployed 
person). 
8 NON-ELIGIBILITY FOR BENEFITS 
In terms of the UIB a contributor who would otherwise be entitled to benefits 
loses entitlement in various circumstances. Entitlement is 10stJor any period 
that a contributor is outside the Republic (clause 6( I )(a)(i)). This arrangement 
is not only practical but also in accordance with C 168 in terms of which 
benefits may be refused. withdrawn. suspended or reduced to the extent 
prescribed for as long as the person concerned is absent from the territory 
of the member state (art 20(a)) However. it seems to be unfair to workers 
to require the payment of benefits regardless of citizenship and simultane-
ously preventing payment of benefits while they are outside the Republic of 
South Africa. 
International law accepts that so-called double-dipping should be prohib-
ited. Convention 168 provides that benefits may be withdrawn. 
suspended or reduced to the extent prescribed for as long as the person 
concerned is in receipt of another income maintenance benefit provided for 
in the legislation of the ILO member concerned, except family benefit. 
provided that the part of the benefit which is suspended does not exceed that 
other benefit (art In the UIA this principle was adhered to in regard to 
UIF benefits bur not in regard to other state-aided funds. The UlB on the one 
hand provides that a contributor is not allowed to claim both unemployment 
and illness benefits from the UIF (clauses 8 and 12) and. on the other hand. 
that entitlement to .!Jnemployment benefits is not exhausted claiming 
maternity benefits.!' 
In regard to double-dipping from other state-provided funds the UIB comes 
closer to international norms by prohibiting the payment of benefits from the 
UIF for any period that the unemployed is In receipt of a monthly pension or 
disability grant from the State or in receipt of a benefit from the Compensa-
tion Commissioner as a result of an occupational injury or disease which 
caused total or temporary unemployment (clause 6(1 HbHi) and Oi)). Since the 
rationale behind double-dipping provisions is that an amount of benefits 
received as unemployment beneFits should take into account income-
replacement benefits received from other branches of the social security 
system. in particular state-provided benefits. it is advisable to include a 
general provision in the envisaged legislation which avoids double-dipping 
with regard to all state-proVided income-replacement benefits. 
16 TllPre is flO enritlement to benefits during a period or absence from the country. 
17 lIlB cl 5 (5) The stated aim ot the latter provision is to eliminate discrimination against 
women. However. it is submitted that the UIB now mtroduces an unjustifiable discrHl1!nation 










































GET TO WORK ON UNEMPLOYMENT 
A contributor is also prevented from claiming unemployment benefits 
while receiving benefits from any unemployment fund or scheme established 
by a bargaining or statutory council (clause 6(I)(b)(iii) UIB), and while 
receiving retrenchment. gratuity. severance or similar payment that was 
received from any source as a result of the contributor's unemployment with 
a particular employer. except when such payment has been exhausted at a 
rate equal to the contributor's usual remuneration while employed by that 
employer (clause 6( 1 )(b)(iv)). This is apparently in line with C 168 which 
provides that where a person received benefits directly from the employer 
or from another source (under national laws. or collective agreements. or as 
severance pay) the principal purpose of which is to contribute towards 
compensating for the loss of earnings suffered in the event of full unem-
ployment. benefits may be suspended for a period corresponding to that 
during which the severance pay compensates for the loss of earings. The 
severance pay may be reduced by an amount corresponding to the lump-
sum value of the unemployment benefit for a period corresponding to that 
during which the severance pay compensates for the loss of earnings (art 22). 
In line with international norms. entitlement is lost if the contributor fails 
to comply with a law relating to unemployment. 
Under the UIA it is a criminal offence to make a fraudulent application for 
benefits or other fraudulent conduct (art 61). In terms of C 168. benefits may 
be refused. withdrawn. suspended or reduced to the extent prescribed when 
the person attempted to obtain. or has obtained. benefits fraudulently (art 
20(e)). The UIB decriminalises fraudulent conduct and brings South African 
legislation in line with international law by providing that a person is 
suspended from receiving benefits for twelve years for making a false 
statement in an application for benefits. or submitting a fraudulent application 
for benefits. or failing to inform an officer that he or she had resumed work 
during the period in respect of which benefits were paid. or failing to comply 
with a written demand issued to pay tax (clause 6( 1 ltd) read with clause 28). 
Lastly. C 168 provides that benefits may be refused. withdrawn. suspended 
or reduced to the extent prescribed when the person concerned has failed 
without Just cause to use the facilities available for placement. vocational 
1M 
guidance. training. retraining or redeployment in suitable employment. The 
UIB provides that entitlement to benefits is lost upon failure to report at the 
times. dates and places stipulated by the claims officer (clause 8(2)(a)) and 
upon refusal without good reason to undergo training and vocational 
counselling for employment under any scheme approved by the Director-
General (clause 8(2)(b)). 
9 THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 
Convention 168 requires dispute resolution mechanisms. The UIA makes no 
provision in this regard. In terms of the UICB the provisions of the Income 
Tax Act relating to the contributions paid or payable in terms of the UIB. 
18 Convention 168 article 20 (fl. Article 21 gives clear guiclellT1es in regard [IJ deterrninin;.; 










































LAW. DE"mCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
assessments. objections and appeals. apply (with the necessary changes 
required by the contexl) to "any assessment. objection and appeal and the 
payment. recovery or refund of the contribution. interest or penalty" (clause 
13 UICB). A contributor who is aggrieved by a decision of the Unemployment 
Jnsurance Commissioner to suspend a right to benefits. or a claims officer's 
decision relating to the payment or non-payment of benefits. may refer the 
dispute for resolution to the CCMA (clause 29 UIB). 
Jt is thus clear that the SARS will adjudicate disputes concerning the as-
sessment of contributions. while disputes concerning the quantum or refusal 
of benefits may be referred to the CCMA. However. it is not clear what the 
position will be if a dispute involves both contributions and benefits. The 
wisdom to have two bodies. in two different departments. adjudicating 
contribution and benefit disputes respectively is questionable. There is also 
uncertainty concerning the forum r'or determining disputes presently falling 
within the ambit of the UlB. According to clause 65 the Labour Coun has 
jurisdiction in respect of all mauers in terms of the UIB except in respect of 
an offence. and "except where this Act provides otherwise". It is not clear 
that the UIB does provide otherwise in any instance. except for clause 29 
which determines that disputes concerning benefits may be referred "for 
resolution" to the CCMA. Since the term "resolution" is normally used to 
refer w [he finalisation of a dispute. the proper interpretation is apparently 
that the CCMA has to arbitrate the dispute. If this is correct. the U IB does not 
meet the international requirement that there should be an appeal proce-
dure. It is in any event debatable whether CCMA arbitration is appropriate 
for settling disputes relating to unemployment benefits. The issues on which 
disputes have to be resolved will be questions whereas CCMA commis-
sioners are not always legally trained. 
10 CONCLUSION 
Although many aspects of the proposed legislation should be reconsidered. 
it is an improvement on the UIA in complying with the constitutional right of 
access to social security and bringing South African legislation in line with the 
norms of international law. 
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